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Abstract
& Neuroimaging studies have identified the anterior para-
cingulate cortex (PCC) as the key prefrontal region subserving
theory of mind. We adopt an evolutionary perspective hy-
pothesizing that, in response to the pressures of social com-
plexity, a mechanism for manipulating information concerning
social interaction has emerged in the anterior PCC. To date,
neuroimaging studies have not properly distinguished between
intentions of persons involved in social interactions and in-
tentions of an isolated person. In two separate fMRI experi-
ments, we demonstrated that the anterior PCC is not necessarily
involved in the understanding of other people’s intentions per
se, but primarily in the understanding of the intentions of
people involved in social interaction. Moreover, this brain region
showed activation when a represented intention implies social
interaction and therefore had not yet actually occurred. This
result suggests that the anterior PCC is also involved in our
ability to predict future intentional social interaction, based on
an isolated agent’s behavior. We conclude that distinct areas of
the neural system underlying theory of mind are specialized
in processing distinct classes of social stimuli. &
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in
research on the neural correlates of social cognition
(Adolphs, 2003; Wood, 2003). Social cognition is defined
as the ability to construct representations of the rela-
tions between oneself and others and to use these rep-
resentations flexibly to guide social behavior (Adolphs,
2001). Within the realm of social cognition, researchers
have focused special attention on the neural correlates
of our ability to explain and predict other people’s
behavior by attributing independent mental states to
them (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This ability is defined as
theory of mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, 1995) or ‘‘men-
talizing’’ (Frith & Frith, 1999).
Neuroimaging studies have shown the existence of a
distributed neural system underlying the ToM mecha-
nism (Calarge, Andreasen, & O’Leary, 2003; Berthoz,
Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002; Calder et al., 2002;
Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; McCabe,
Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; Vogeley et al.,
2001; Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle´, & Decety, 2000;
Castelli, Happe´, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Gallagher et al.,
2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Fletcher et al., 1995;
Goel, Grafman, Sadato, & Hallett, 1995; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1994). This system includes at least three distinct
brain areas: (1) the superior temporal sulcus (STS), (2)
the temporal poles, and (3) the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC). Some studies also show amygdala and orbital–
frontal cortex activation (Berthoz et al., 2002; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Baron-Cohen et al., 1994). A current
widely accepted view attributes specific roles to these
areas. More specifically, the STS is responsible for the
detection of agency (Frith & Frith, 2003) as well as the
initial analysis of stimuli corresponding to another per-
son’s biological motion, for instance, gaze direction; lip
reading; and body, hand, and mouth movements (Alli-
son, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). The temporal poles,
associated with mnemonic processes, supply the seman-
tic and episodic context of stimuli being processed.
Finally, the MPFC contributes to subsequent stimuli
analysis and produces an explicit representation of our
own and other people’s mental states.
The present work focused on the role of the MPFC,
which includes the anterior paracingulate cortex (PCC),
located at the border of Brodmann’s areas 32 and 10.
The anterior part of the prefrontal cortex (BA 10) en-
larged and specialized during hominid evolution and
is concerned with higher cognitive functions, such as
planning future action and taking initiative (Semende-
feri, Armstrong, Schleicher, Zilles, & Van Hoesen, 2001).
The social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998) links evolu-
tionary pressure for this progressive brain enlargement
to the particularly complex nature of human social
interaction. This pressure imposed the evolution of
mechanisms that manipulate information concerning
social interaction. We hypothesized that the anterior
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PCC subserves a mechanism specifically designated to
comprehend the mental states of conspecifics partici-
pating in social interaction.
To explore this hypothesis, we derived our conceptual
categories from Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Prag-
matics, discriminating between social interactive con-
texts and not interactive ones. Indeed, the two domains
generally distinguish between two basic kinds of inten-
tion: ‘‘intention in action’’ and ‘‘communicative inten-
tion.’’ An intention in action is a directed mental
representation activating the goals and subgoals that
are specific to the realization of an objective (Searle,
1983). This intention can be realized by an isolated
person who is acting, and we shall therefore refer to it
as private intention (PInt). Conversely, a communicative
intention (CInt) is the intention to communicate a
meaning to someone else plus the intention that this
intention should be recognized by the addressee (Bara,
2004; Grice, 1975). This second type of intention can
therefore occur only during social interaction. ToM neu-
roimaging studies have not yet distinguished between
CInt and PInt, often grouping them into the same theo-
retical category. One exception is a recent study specif-
ically centered on CInt (Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003); this
kind of intention, however, was not compared with PInt.
We hypothesized that the anterior PCC is implicated
primarily in understanding the mental states of an agent
involved in social interaction (CInt) and not necessarily
in understanding mental states of an agent not involved
in social interaction (PInt). To test this hypothesis, we
designed a first experiment in which we constructed
stories involving PInt, as well as CInt. We predicted a
specific activation of the anterior PCC in the social
interactive contexts. In a second experiment, we tested
our prediction in a second independent sample. More-
over, we introduced a new condition where social
interaction was foreseen but had not yet occurred (i.e.,
when there was only the potential for social interaction).
For this new condition, we predicted intermediate an-
terior PCC activation.
EXPERIMENT 1
We used fMRI to test our hypothesis by devising an ex-
perimental protocol that presented comic strips to par-
ticipants during scanning. Participants were asked to
demonstrate their comprehension of stories by choosing
logical story endings. Stories pertained to the following
conceptual categories:
1. Physical causality (Ph-C) among objects (the non-
intentional control condition), for example, a ball blown
by a gust of wind knocks over and breaks several bottles.
2. Private intention by one agent (PInt-1), for ex-
ample, changing a broken bulb in order to read a book.
3. Private intentions by two agents (PInt-2) acting
independently (not involved in social interaction), for
example, an agent is building a doghouse, another agent
is setting up a tent to camp. This condition was intro-
duced to control for the number of persons involved in
the story.
4. Communicative intention (CInt) conveyed by com-
municative gestures, for example, pointing to a bottle to
request it. This condition represented prototypical so-
cial interaction.
All stories presented in Experiment 1 are listed in
Appendix A.
Results
Behavioral Results
Response accuracy (number of correct answers, maxi-
mum score = 11) and reaction times in msec (for cor-
rect answers only), as well as standard deviations, for
the respective conditions were as follows: Ph-C 10.5
(±0.797) and 2935 msec (±715), PInt-1 10.08 (±1.084)
and 3371 (±770) msec, PInt-2 10 (±1.279) and 3448
(±800) msec, and CInt 9.92 (±0.793) and 3123 (±631)
msec. Neither response accuracy [F(3,44) = 0.791, p =
.506] nor reaction times [F(3,44) = 1.235, p = .308]
revealed significant condition effects. We therefore con-
sidered the four tasks equally difficult.
Neuroimaging Results
The main effects of the experimental conditions against
the control condition (Ph-C) are shown in Figure 1 and
Table 1. As can been seen in Figure 1, a typical ToM
pattern emerged only in the contrast between the CInt
condition versus the Ph-C condition, with activation in
the anterior PCC and posterior parts of the brain as the
STS and the temporal poles. Only posterior brain areas
were significantly activated for private intentions (PInt-1
and PInt-2). Although a small spot of greater anterior
activation was also observed in the PInt-1 condition, this
was not located in the anterior PCC, but more than
20 mm posterior to it ( y = 33), in the anterior cingulate
proper. In the PInt-2 condition, there was anterior
activation only in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, but again, not in the anterior PCC. A more detailed
analysis of anterior-PCC activation showed a significant
main effect of condition [F(2,24) = 23.00, p < .0001].
Bonferroni’s post hoc tests were significant between CInt
and the other two conditions (i.e., PInt-1 and PInt-2). The
difference between the PInt-1 and the PInt-2 conditions
was not significant.
Discussion: Experiment 1
We focused our attention on the anterior PCC, starting
out with a clear a priori hypothesis, and the results of
Experiment 1 confirmed our hypothesis. The anterior
PCC was significantly activated in the CInt but not in the
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PInt-1 condition, and the differences in anterior PCC
activation between the CInt and PInt-1 conditions were
significant. Our results demonstrate that the represen-
tation of private intentions in action does not activate
the anterior PCC and that this area is activated only for
intentions involving social interaction. An alternative
explanation for our results, namely, the varying number
of persons between the CInt and PInt-1 conditions, was
ruled out by our control condition PInt-2. There was no
anterior PCC activation in the PInt-2 condition, and the
differences in this area between the CInt and PInt-2
conditions were significant.
One might argue that a limitation in our experimental
design was that the anterior PCC activation we observed
may have been due to the particular modality used for
conveying CInt (i.e., communicative gestures). However,
a recent study (Kampe et al., 2003) found activation in
the anterior PCC for nearly the same coordinates (x = 6,
y = 60, z = 20) using other modalities, namely, CInts
conveyed both by direct eye gaze and by hearing one’s
own name.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of our first experiment suggest that the
anterior PCC is active in representing the intentions of
people ‘‘actually’’ involved in social interaction. A crucial
biological function of ToM is to predict other people’s
behavior by attributing intentions to them. Thus, one
challenge to our hypothesis was to demonstrate that the
anterior PCC is also active during the representation of
an isolated person’s intentions when he or she is
preparing ‘‘future’’ social interaction. To this end, we
introduced a new conceptual category: prospective so-
cial intention (PSInt). PSInt can be considered a PInt
directed towards subsequent social interaction (e.g., a
person preparing a romantic dinner). In PSInt, social
interaction has not occurred, but it is foreseen. We
therefore predicted intermediate anterior PCC activation
in this new condition (CInt > PSInt > PInt-1). This
prediction is congruent with imagery experiments,
which have shown that imagining visual stimuli activates
the same brain regions that are activated during percep-
tion of the same visual stimuli, although to a lesser ex-
tent (see, for example, Umilta` et al., 2001). PSInt stories
substituted the PInt-2 condition of Experiment 1. All
design and neuroimaging parameters for Experiment 2
were the same as in the first experiment. The PSInt-
stories are listed in Appendix B.
Results: Experiment 2
Behavioral Results
Response accuracy (number of correct answers, maxi-
mum score = 11) and reaction times in msec (for cor-
rect answers only), as well as standard deviations for
the respective conditions, were as follows: Ph-C 10.58
(±0.669) and 2863 msec (±600), PInt-1 9.83 (±0.577)
and 3164 (±543) msec, PSInt 10 (±1.045) and 3392
(±425) msec, and CInt 9.83 (±0.937) and 2908 (±403)
msec. There was no significant condition effect on
response accuracy [F(3,44) = 2.212, p = .100]. A con-
dition effect on reaction times was found [F(3,44) =
2.905, p = .045]. However, all post hoc multiple com-
Figure 1. Statistical
parametric maps (SPM{Z}) as
maximum intensity projections
for the main effects of
condition against control
condition Ph-C in Experiment 1
(random effects analysis, p <
.001 at the voxel level, p < .05
at the cluster level). Views are
from the right, top, and
behind. In the right projection,
the region of the anterior PCC
is marked with a circle. As can
be seen, significant activation of
the anterior PCC was found
only for the communicative
intention condition (CInt) but
for none of the two private
intention conditions (PInt-1
and PInt-2). Ph-C = physical
causality; PInt-1 = private
intention by one agent;
PInt-2 = private intentions
by two agents; CInt =
communicative intention.
1856 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 16, Number 10
parisons revealed no statistical significance ( p > .05).
Once more, we considered the four tasks to be equally
difficult.
Neuroimaging Results
The main effects of the experimental conditions against
the control condition (Ph-C) are shown in Figure 2 and
Table 2. As can been seen in Figure 2, a typical ToM
pattern emerged once more in the CInt condition. More-
over, the same pattern including anterior PCC activation
was also observed in the prospective social intention
condition (PSInt). Again, no anterior PCC activation was
observed for the PInt condition (PInt-1). A more detailed
analysis of anterior PCC activation showed a significant
main effect of condition [F(2,24) = 39.96, p < .0001]. As
Table 1. Results of the Condition Effects Against the Control Condition Ph-C (Compare Also Figure 1) of Experiment 1 (Random
Effects Analysis, p < .001 at the Voxel Level, p < .05 at the Cluster Level)
Experiment 1 PInt-1 PInt-2 CInt
Region
Putative
Brodmann’s Area x y z Z x y z Z x y z Z
Precuneus 7 3 60 36 4.28 9 54 42 5.63 9 57 42 5.34
7 6 57 48 4.96 3 57 54 5.18 6 54 45 5.14
Lingual gyrus 17 6 87 12 4.49
Medial occipital gyrus 19 21 96 18 3.98
45 78 6 3.99 42 84 3 4.74
Superior temporal gyrus 22 57 51 12 3.95 51 42 12 4.8
36 51 21 5.00
Medial temporal gyrus 39 54 63 9 4.58 57 51 12 5.44 54 60 12 5.17
48 60 24 4.06
Medial temporal gyrus 21 48 27 0 4.87
Anterior temporal pole 21 63 3 15 4.46 57 9 15 4.8 54 0 21 4.82
63 15 15 5.28
Anterior cingulate 24/32 6 33 21 3.75
6 36 27 3.68
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 54 33 9 4.11
47 51 30 12 4.11
Inferior prefrontal cortex 45 57 27 3 3.66
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 44/46 45 21 24 4.18
Superior frontal sulcus 8 24 42 45 4.86
12 39 39 4.47
Dorsal frontal gyrus 9 6 60 24 4.25
9 51 36 4.44
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 0 54 12 3.57*
Hippocampus 21 27 3 4.25
36 27 12 3.7
Cerebellum 39 51 27 4.76
21 39 18 4.18
42 69 24 4.9 3 57 9 3.73
Ph-C = physical causality; PInt-1 = private intention by one agent; PInt-2 = private intentions by two agents; CInt = communicative intention.
*p < .05, small volume correction.
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can be seen in Figure 3, anterior PCC showed the
predicted pattern of activation (CInt > PSInt > PInt-1).
Bonferroni’s post hoc tests were significant for all be-
tween-condition comparisons.
Discussion: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1,
that is, the anterior PCC was significantly activated in
the CInt condition but not in the PInt-1 condition. Fur-
thermore, our second hypothesis was also confirmed
with intermediate activation of the anterior PCC in the
PSInt condition. This points to the specific role of the
anterior PCC for manipulating information about so-
cial interactions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main aim of the present work was to explore the
hypothesis that the anterior PCC is not necessarily in-
volved in human understanding of other people’s mental
states per se, but primarily in people’s understanding of
a particular class of mental states. In accordance with
this hypothesis, we obtained three main results.
First, two independent experiments revealed specific
activation of the anterior PCC for the representations of
intentions involving social interaction. Our control con-
dition PInt-2 in Experiment 1 guaranteed that the an-
terior PCC activation we observed was due to the
representation of intentions involved in social interac-
tion and not only to the number of represented inten-
tions. In fact, the PInt-2 condition involved intentions of
two persons acting in isolation but not ‘‘interacting.’’
Earlier studies frequently used a combination of in-
tentions, some of which referred to social interaction
and some of which did not (Brunet et al., 2000, 2003;
Gallagher et al., 2000). We believe that the MPFC
activation observed in these studies can be attributed
to the fact that participants were presented with stimuli
depicting intentions concerning agents in situations of
both isolation and social interaction. Although the
above-cited studies indeed represented breakthroughs
in the field, our work is based more specifically on a
distinction among different types of attribution of inten-
tion and their neural correlates.
Our conclusion regarding the special role of the
anterior PCC in social interaction concerns passive off-
line tasks in which participants observe social interac-
tion. Recent studies have used active on-line tasks in
which participants are directly involved in social inter-
action (Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001).
Interestingly, these studies have found very similar co-
ordinates in the anterior PCC: x = 8, y = 54, z = 12 in
Gallagher et al.’s (2002) study, and x = 5, y = 52, z = 10
in McCabe et al.’s (2001) study.1 These data confirm the
crucial role of this brain area in social interaction.
A second result was that we also observed anterior
PCC activation when social interaction was foreseen but
had not actually taken place (prospective social inten-
tion). This result suggests that this area is involved in
mentalizing future social interaction, based on a single
agent’s behavior. Implied social interaction may explain
why some studies have demonstrated medial prefrontal
activation without directly involving social interaction.
Figure 2. Statistical
parametric maps (SPM{Z}) as
maximum intensity projections
for the main effects of
condition against control
condition Ph-C in Experiment 2
(random effects analysis, p <
.001 at the voxel level, p < .05
at the cluster level). Views are
from the right, top, and behind.
In the right projection, the
region of the anterior PCC is
marked with a circle. As can
be seen, significant activation
of the anterior PCC was found
for the CInt as well as for the
PSInt but, as in Experiment 1,
not for the PInt-1 condition.
Ph-C = physical causality;
PInt-1 = private intention by
one agent; PSInt = prospective
social intention; CInt =
communicative intention.
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For instance, Goel et al. (1995) asked their participants
to infer whether a historical figure would understand
the function of various objects. We argue that objects
belonging to the categories of food preparation, food
serving, adornments, toys, and games refer to contexts
of use that are very similar to our category of implied
social interaction. To date, only two studies have inves-
tigated the representation of abstract person-based
knowledge (Mason, Banfield, & Macrae, 2004; Mitchell,
Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002), finding medial prefrontal
activation for this type of knowledge. Mitchell et al.’s
(2002) study of social knowledge used adjectives like
‘‘energetic’’ or ‘‘assertive’’ to describe people. Many of
these adjectives apply to personal characteristics appar-
ent in social interaction. We therefore think that the
medial prefrontal activation observed in the cited study
might have been due to participants’stimuli-induced
imagination of social interaction. This explanation does
not appear so straightforward for Mason et al.’s (2004)
study, in which participants were asked if simple actions
like leaping, sitting, or swallowing could be performed
by people or dogs. Yet, the medial prefrontal activity
Table 2. Results of the Condition Effects against the Control Condition Ph-C (Compare also Figure 2) of Experiment 2 (Random
Effects Analysis, p < .001 at the Voxel Level, p < .05 at the Cluster Level)
Experiment 2 PInt PSInt CInt
Region
Putative
Brodmann’s Area x y z Z x y z Z x y z Z
Precuneus 7 3 54 42 3.50 3 60 30 4.02 3 54 51 5.31
7 6 45 60 3.92 6 51 39 4.78 6 51 30 4.32
Fusiform gyrus 37 42 60 18 4.15
Precentral gyrus 4 24 27 57 3.92
51 6 48 3.97
Superior temporal gyrus 22 51 42 21 5.24 57 54 15 4.33 54 48 18 5.33
57 48 18 4.68
Superior temporal gyrus 21/38 45 12 39 4.76
Medial temporal gyrus 22/39 45 60 9 4.21 45 51 9 4.35 45 51 12 5.35
42 57 18 4.34
Medial temporal gyrus 21 57 12 15 3.59
51 27 3 4.69
Medial temporal gyrus 21 51 3 27 4.13
21 54 0 24 4.58
Inferior temporal gyrus 20 51 18 15 3.97
54 15 18 4.26
Anterior cingulate 32 6 18 45 3.58
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 54 24 9 3.84
47 42 33 15 4.40 36 30 21 4.19 48 30 12 6.08
Medial frontal gyrus 8 30 30 42 3.61
Orbito-frontal 11 6 51 12 4.53 0 51 15 4.55 3 54 15 3.65
3 54 15 3.93 3 48 12 4.74
Gyrus frontalis medialis 10 18 54 12 3.74
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 3 54 12 3.52* 0 60 18 4.96*
3 54 15 3.81*
Parahippocampus 27 36 21 4.44
Ph-C = physical causality; PInt-1 = private intention by one agent; CInt = communicative intention; PSInt = prospective social intention.
*p < .05, small volume correction.
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described in this study was located much higher (about
20 mm) than the anterior PCC activity found in our
study or for example, in that of Gallagher et al.’s (2002)
study. A possible explanation is that different areas of
the MPFC may subserve different aspects of the process-
ing of personal stimuli. This hypothesis will require fur-
ther testing.
Third, we found that people’s understanding of a
single acting agent’s mental states does not necessarily
depend on anterior PCC recruitment. Therefore, the
posterior parts of the neural system underlying ToM
are not simply stations through which socially pertinent
information f lows towards prefrontal areas. Rather,
these areas may suffice for representing agents’ mental
states, as long as the agents are acting outside social
interaction. Such a conclusion would fit the findings
from a recent study conducted by Saxe and Kanwisher
(2003) quite nicely. They demonstrated in their first
experiment that a region in the human temporo-parietal
junction is involved specifically in reasoning about the
contents of another person’s mind. We underscore that
these authors’ second experiment yielded coordinates
that were very similar to ours in the MPFC (x = 6, y =
57, z = 18) when they introduced stories (at least the
ones reported in their appendix) describing agents in
social interaction.
One limit of our study is that there was no indepen-
dent variable that would have quantified amount of men-
talizing for each condition. This is also a general problem
with other ToM studies. At this point, it is important to
underscore that our main aim was to investigate—within
the domain of mentalizing—the ‘‘qualitative’’ differences
between people’s understanding of intentions that do
and do not concern social interaction. We did not claim
that the function of the anterior PCC is to process social
interaction versus mentalizing. Indeed, our claim was
more specific, namely, that the anterior PCC is primar-
ily activated ‘‘when mentalizing occurs in the context
of social interaction’’ and is not necessarily activated
when mentalizing occurs in situations not involving so-
cial interaction.
Although it has been suggested that the interaction of
minds is at the heart of ToM tasks (Frith & Frith, 1999),
our study has for the first time dissociated the mental-
izing of interacting minds from the mentalizing of iso-
lated minds. Why should mentalizing in social interaction
be different from mentalizing without social interaction?
As early as 1994, Leslie proposed the important ToM
mechanism of decoupling: Mental representations are
decoupled from the physical world so that they are no
longer subject to normal input–output relations. This
decoupling mechanism has been attributed to the ante-
rior PCC (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003).
We suggest a more specific decoupling function of the
anterior PCC (i.e., that it is active when the task is to keep
two or more interacting minds separate in one’s own
mind). Thus, decoupling may also play an important role
in situations where explicit mental self–other distinctions
are required.
Lastly, patients with schizophrenia have shown behav-
ioral deficits in ToM tasks (Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, &
Lieberman, 2003; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) and attribu-
Figure 3. Statistical
parametric map (SPM{Z}) of
the between condition effect
(CInt > PInt-1) of
Experiments 1 (on the left)
and 2 (on the right) projected
onto the standard T1-template
of SPM 99 is shown in the
upper part (random effects
analysis, p < .001 at the voxel
level, p < .05 at the cluster
level). The activation profile
for the anterior PCC
(Experiment 1: x = 6, y = 57,
z = 21, Z = 3.38; Experiment
2: x = 0, y = 54, z = 21,
Z = 4.69) in all three
conditions is shown in the
lower part. The bars indicate
effect size (mean of parameter
estimates from a single-subject
analysis with standard error)
for the respective condition
against control condition Ph-C.
Bonferroni’s post hoc tests in Experiment 1 were significant for the comparison of CInt versus the PInt-1 and PInt-2 conditions ( p < .05). The
difference between the PInt-1 and the PInt-2 conditions was not significant ( p > .05). In Experiment 2, Bonferroni’s post hoc test was significant
for all between-condition comparisons. Ph-C = physical causality; PInt-1 = private intention by one agent; PInt-2 = private intentions by two
agents acting independently; PSInt = prospective social intention; CInt = communicative intention.
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tion errors for events and thoughts (Walter & Spitzer,
2003); they also tend to show deficits in social interac-
tion (Mueser & Bellack, 1998). A recent PET study
investigating ToM in patients with schizophrenia found
reduced activation of the MPFC (Brunet et al., 2003).
However, the cartoon stimuli used in this study did not
distinguish between ToM stories with and ToM stories
without social interaction. In contrast, our task does
make this distinction. We therefore maintain that our
task would be better suited to investigate the role of
social interaction in ToM deficits in schizophrenia.
Conclusions
In summary, our results suggest that the standard defi-
nition of ToM in neuroimaging studies (i.e., ToM as the
ability to attribute mental states to self and to others) is
not specific enough, at least concerning the role of
the anterior PCC. This brain area is specifically involved
in understanding intentions in actual or implied social
interaction. It is not involved in understanding simple
intentions of agents acting outside a social interaction.
We suggest that it would be more appropriate to
consider that distinct areas of the ToM’s neural network
can be specialized in processing different classes of
social stimuli. This might help researchers and clinicians
to better understand ToM disorders in both neuropsy-
chological and psychiatric patients.
METHODS
Participants
Thirteen healthy, right-handed volunteers (6 men and
7 women; age range 20–28 years; mean 25.15 years, SD
1.99) participated in Experiment 1. Twelve healthy, right-
handed volunteers (6 men and 6 women; age range
19–27 years; mean 24.75 years, SD 2.63) participated in
Experiment 2. The University of Ulm’s Ethics Committee
(Germany) approved the studies. Written informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants prior to scanning.
Experimental Design
Both experiments had the same design, with one excep-
tion: the PSInt condition in Experiment 2 substituted
the PInt-2 condition of Experiment 1. Participants were
asked to read short comic strips presented via ‘‘goggles’’
during scanning (see below). Each strip was presented in
two phases. In Phase 1 (the story phase), three pictures
depicting an unfolding story plot were displayed for 3 sec
each. During Phase 2 (the choice phase), three answer
pictures were presented simultaneously for 7 sec. The
participants’ task was to choose the one picture showing
the logical story ending. Participants indicated their
choices by pushing one of three buttons. Visual location
of the correct answer was randomized across trials. Af-
ter each trial, (i.e., the presentation of one comic strip), a
blank screen was shown for a period varying between 7
and 11 sec. A quite similar experimental design was
described by Brunet et al. (2000).
Eleven comic strips were presented for each of the four
conditions in both experiments, making up a total of
44 trials for each experiment. The comic strips were
presented in randomized order. Participants were tested
in two sessions of 22 trials each per experiment, with each
session lasting approximately 9 min. Before each exper-
iment, participants received in-scanner training with
comic strips for each category; none of the training comic
strips were later presented during either experiment.
During scanning, participants wore luminescent crys-
tal display glasses (i.e., ‘‘goggles,’’ Resonance Technolo-
gies, Northridge, CA). The digital-vision glasses were
connected to the experimenter’s monitor. Stimuli were
presented by means of Presentation software (Neuro-
behavioral Systems).
Behavioral Data Analysis
Participants’ reaction times and response accuracy were
measured during scanning. Data were analyzed in a one-
way ANOVA with subsequent comparisons between
means, using Bonferroni’s post hoc test.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
fMRI data were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens
Magnetom Symphony whole-body MRI System equipped
with a head volume coil. T2*-weighted functional MR
images were obtained using echo-planar imaging in an
axial orientation. Image size was 64 by 64 pixels, with a
192-mm field of view. One volume covering the whole
brain consisted of 25 slices of a 4-mm slice thickness and
a 1-mm gap. Time of repetition (TR) was 2.25 sec, echo
time (TE) was 40 msec.
Data preprocessing and statistical analyses were con-
ducted with SPM 99 (Statistical Parametric Mapping,
Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK)
and MATLAB 6.3 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). The
first four volumes of each session were discarded to
allow for T2-equilibration. Individual functional images
were corrected-for-motion artifacts by realignment to
the fifth volume of each session. All images were spa-
tially normalized (3  3  3 mm) to the echo-planar
template of SPM in MNI space. Volumes were resliced by
sinc interpolation. Images were spatially smoothed with
an 8-mm full width at half maximum isotropic gaussian
kernel. For each condition, the variance of each voxel
was estimated according to the general linear model.
Images were globally scaled, high-frequency noise was
removed with a low-pass filter (gaussian kernel with
4.0 sec FWHM), and low-frequency drifts were removed
with a high-pass filter.
In the first level of analysis, each participant was an-
alyzed separately. Regressors were defined for story
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phase and choice phase for each of the four conditions
separately as box cars convolved with the canonical
hemodynamic response function implemented in SPM
99. Contrast images for each condition were calculated
by using the regressors for story and choice phase
together. The resulting four contrast images per partic-
ipants were used for a second-level analysis to account
for interindividual variance. Individual regionally specific
condition effects for each participant were calculated
in one-sample t tests. T statistics for each voxel were
thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected for multiple com-
parisons. Results were extent-threshold corrected in
order to reduce type-1 errors resulting in a p value of
< .05 at the cluster level. For our prefrontal region of
interest (anterior PCC), we used a small volume cor-
rection with a sphere of 10 mm around the maximal
z-score in the region of the anterior PCC, based on
previous studies, resulting in a corrected p value of
< .05 at the voxel level. All areas were identified
with the atlases of Duvernoy (1991) and Talairach and
Tournoux (1988).
APPENDIX A
Ph-C Condition
A ball blown by a gust of wind knocks over and breaks
several bottles; a fire blazes in a field and burns a tree;
the bathroom sink drainpipe ruptures and floods the
bathroom; a boulder rolls down slope and breaks a
wooden fence; a breaker hits the beach and knocks
over a beach umbrella; a boat loses its anchoring and
breaks up on a rock; a gust of wind knocks over a
basket, spilling its contents; sunlight shining through a
magnifying glass sets paper on fire; a shelf nog gives way
and the objects resting on the shelf fall to the floor; a
coconut falls from a palm tree and breaks a pitcher; a
sheet drying on the line is blown by the wind and
knocks over and breaks a flower vase; lightning strikes
a tree and sets it on fire (training).
PInt-1 Condition
Changing a broken bulb in order to read a book; working
in the kitchen to prepare oneself a meal; tapping wine
from a barrel to taste it; knitting oneself a sweater; re-
pairing a chair to be able to sit on it; diving to take pic-
tures underwater; cutting down a tree to chop up some
firewood; putting on shaving creme to shave; painting a
picture of a landscape; lighting a barbecue to grill oneself
some meat; picking a bunch of grapes to eat them;
kneading pizza dough and putting the pizza into the
oven (training).
PInt-2 Condition
Building a doghouse/setting up a tent to camp; putting
bait on hook to fish/lying down on a beach chair to get
some sun; preparing painting equipment to whitewash
a wall/digging a hole to plant a seedling; unloading fruit
from a truck/repainting one’s bicycle; shoveling snow to
clear the driveway/making a snowman; cooking oneself
a fish on the grill/ laying down under a tree to read a
book; cleaning a store window/digging a hole in the
street with a jackhammer; getting ready to dive into a
swimming pool/cutting and squeezing oranges to make
oneself fresh orange juice; playing basketball alone/
washing a car; making a sandcastle/pruning a hedge;
using a typewriter to write something/looking in a book
cupboard for a book to read; washing and hanging
clothes out to dry/building a tree house (training).
CInt Condition
Pointing to a bottle to request it; showing a map to
request directions; a baby lifting up his arms to ask to be
picked up; showing a boy with muddy hands where to
wash them; begging a passer-by for money; pointing to a
seat on a train to ask if it is free; hailing a taxi; requesting
a particular dessert from a cafeteria worker by pointing
to it; raising one’s hand in class; forbidding to smoke in a
bar; putting one’s index finger to one’s mouth to tell
someone to be quiet; pointing to the dinner table to
indicate that dinner is ready (training).
APPENDIX B
PSInt Condition
A person preparing a romantic dinner; decorating a
room for a party; setting up to display goods at an open
market; a young man wrapping an engagement ring;
dressing for a tennis game; preparing six champagne
glasses for a toast; heading towards a phone booth and
picking up the handset; a priest preparing a church for a
ceremony; heating milk and pouring it into a baby
bottle; preparing a flower bouquet with flowers cut
from one’ garden to give to someone; a doctor prepar-
ing a syringe for an injection; a clown getting ready to go
into the circus arena (training).
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Note
1. The study of McCabe et al. (2001) does not report coor-
dinates in numbers. Therefore, they can only be approximately
estimated from their Figure 4. We adopted the estimation as
reported in the article of Gallagher et al. (2002).
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